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PERPETUITIES: THREE ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF MY FATHER
SUSAN F. FRENCH*
The Rule Against Perpetuities is afrequent source offrustration and puzzlement for prop-
erty students, professors, and practitioners In this Article, the Author presents three essays;
her method of analyzingperpetuitiesproblems, a proposal for refinement of the common law
rule, and an examination of the possible benefits of dead hand control Although the Author
has followed in her father's footsteps, becoming a property professor, some of her views on
perpetuities diverge from his. Because scholarly discussion of perpetuities historically has
taken the form of "Article and Reply" in various Law Reviews, Professor Robert L
Fletcher's response follows his daughter's essays.
1. Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror
2. Ending the Perpetuities Wars of the Late Twentieth Century: A
Better Reform Package
3. Why Not a 90-Year Trust? What's So Bad About Dead Hand
Control, Anyway?
An extraordinary amount of scholarly discourse has poured forth in
recent years on the subject of the Rule Against Perpetuities (the
Rule).' Now that I have an excuse, I welcome the opportunity to add
my two-cents worth. My father, Professor Robert Fletcher, has
devoted a substantial part of his scholarly career to teaching and writ-
ing about the Rule.2 His insights into its rigorous internal logic3 led
him to a marvelous method of teaching the Rule, which I learned at
his feet-or more accurately from a copy of his notes he gave me when
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; B.A., 1964, Stanford University;
J.D., 1967, University of Washington.
1. The classic statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule) is: "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2. Fletcher, Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63 WASH. L. REV. 791 (1988)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Basic Clarity]; Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform
Without Waiting, 20 STAN. L. REv. 459 (1968) [hereinafter Fletcher, Discrete Invalidity].
3. Professor Jesse Dukeminier points out that the Rule Against Perpetuities did not become a
purely logical theorem until the nineteenth century case, Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 yes. Jr.
112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805). Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 1867, 1870 (1986). Professor Dukeminier has played an important inspirational role in my
life, and much of what I know about future interests, and the Rule, I have learned from him and
his delightful casebooks (for which, Stan Johanson, a former student of my father's, shares the
credit). I am pleased and proud to have had the opportunity to join him as a colleague on the
UCLA faculty.
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I first taught advanced future interests in 1976. His precise under-
standing of the Rule's operation5 also led him to an elegantly simple
proposal for refining the common law Rule to prune its worst excesses
without compromising its rigid integrity.
In these essays I pay tribute to his career at the University of Wash-
ington Law School by celebrating his contributions and calling them
to the attention of my colleagues in the field.6 His work provides the
basis for a method of teaching the Rule that shows promise for reduc-
ing, if not ending, the Rule's Reign of Terror in American law schools.
That method is the subject of my first essay. In my second essay, I
incorporate his proposal for refining the common law rule, which he
titled a Rule of Discrete Invalidity, as the key element of a total
reform package. I offer that package as the basis for a peace treaty in
the Perpetuities Wars of the Late Twentieth Century. In my third
essay, I offer some thoughts about the need for dead hand control that
he will no doubt regard as heresy, demonstrating once again-as Pro-
fessor Dukeminier has so poignantly lamented over recent develop-
ments of the wait and see doctrine 7-that the fathers can't keep
control of the children, even for lives in being plus 21 years.
4. The other major sources from whom I learned future interests law were Professor Harry
Cross, from whom I took the course, and Professors Olin Browder, Lawrence Waggoner, &
Richard Wellman, whose richly detailed case book, FAMILY PROPERTY SETrLEMENTS (2d ed.
1973), I used when I taught a separate course in future interests. In my early teaching days, I
also found L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1958) an indispensable companion
during long tense evenings of class preparation.
5. Dad always has been a good mathematician, and a rigorous logician, which may explain
why he is intrigued by the Rule Against Perpetuities, and why he is able to penetrate its
mysteries better than the rest of us. His first love, and college major, was engineering. When he
took up law as a career, he brought with him his mathematical approach to solving problems. I,
who unfortunately did not inherit his mathematical genes, have often taken advantage of his
mathematical abilities. He babysat me through high school calculus. He rescued me in law
practice from making the lengthy reiterative calculations to calculate interrelated state and
federal taxes by drawing me a set of equations. More recently, he taught me how to solve
advancement hotchpot problems requiring proportional reductions by an example using thefts
from a cookie jar-a wonderful technique for students, like me, who have trouble working with
ratios. One of my favorite memories is of watching him grade bluebooks using a slide rule-
something I have never seen another law professor do!
6. Although he has published his analysis of the Rule, and his elegantly simple idea for
refining it, his work, like the Rule itself, is difficult to understand without a guide. I hope these
essays will make it more accessible.
7. Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987).
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I. ENDING THE RULE'S REIGN OF TERROR 8
The victims of the Reign of Terror engendered by the Rule Against
Perpetuities are not those whose interests are threatened by unborn
widows, fertile octogenarians, and magic gravel pits, but the law stu-
dents and practitioners laboring in the fields of property law.9 Build-
ing from Dad's analysis of the Rule, and the set of notes he gave me so
long ago, I have developed a method of teaching the Rule that shows
promise of reducing, if not ending, the Rule's Reign of Terror. Dad's
central insights, which underlie my method, are that the concept of
measuring lives is meaningless, and that starting a perpetuities analysis
by looking for validating lives is backwards.' °
My method begins the analysis of any future interest subject to the
Rule by identifying the conditions precedent that must be satisfied
before the interest can vest. 1 Then I identify the events that will sat-
isfy the conditions and lead to vesting. If there is more than one event,
I identify the various sequences of events that will lead to vesting.1 2
Only after I have identified a particular sequence do I look for a vali-
dating life. When I am only trying to determine whether there is a
violation of the common law Rule in its traditional form, I stop my
analysis when I find a sequence that has no validating life.13 When I
am teaching students how to work with the Rule, I try to identify all
possible sequences that will lead to vesting, and search for a validating
life for each sequence.
This method lends itself readily to classroom use. I begin by writing
a conveyance on the board. 4 I ask students to classify the future
interests and identify those subject to the Rule. Then I ask them to
identify the conditions precedent to each interest, and I list the condi-
8. The title, of course, is from Leach's famous article advocating adoption of what has
become the wait and see doctrine, Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 (1952).
9. Professor Bloom, in a recent article, convincingly demonstrates that very little litigation
involving claims that future interests violate the Rule reaches appellate courts. Bloom,
Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REv. 23, 33-39 (1987).
10. Fletcher, Basic Clarity, supra note 2, at 803-08.
11. Vesting for perpetuities purposes requires not only that all conditions precedent be
satisfied, but also that all classes be closed (or, in other words, that remainders not be subject to
open).
12. If failure of the interest is a possibility, I also identify sequences that will lead to failure.
13. le., there is no one alive at the effective date within whose lifetime or within 21 years after
whose death the vesting will necessarily take place.
14. The students must first understand the ground rules: only class gifts, contingent
remainders and executory interests are subject to the Rule; vesting means the clas's is closed and
all conditions precedent have been met; effective date means the date of the testators death if the
instrument is a will, the date an inter vivos conveyance becomes effective, or the date an
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tions on the board. I also ask for and list the events that will close a
class gift both physiologically and under the rule of convenience.15
Next, I draw a time line on the board that begins with the effective
date. Just to the left of the effective date I list the people we know
were alive at that time. Then I ask students to suggest events that
could happen after the effective date that would lead to vesting of the
interest.' 6 I mark each sequence on the time line, and then ask the
students to look for people who were alive at the effective date of the
instrument and try to determine whether they will necessarily still be
alive when the vesting occurs, or will have died within 21 years of that
time.
To determine whether there are any such people, who will serve as
validating lives if they exist, I kill each one off as soon after the effec-
tive date as possible. As soon as a student suggests that some of the
people in the City of Los Angeles were undoubtedly living at the effec-
tive date and still would have been alive at the vesting date, I draw a
big vertical line just to the right of the effective date to represent a
disaster that kills off everyone except those on our list of lives in being.
If there are still any people from the list of lives in being who appear to
be alive within 21 years of the vesting time, we try again to kill them
off more than 21 years before the vesting event. If we cannot do it
without changing the vesting sequence, I tell them that we have found
a validating life for that sequence, and we go on to the next.
We then look for all other possible sequences of events that could
lead to vesting of the future interests. Referring to our lists of the
conditions precedent, class closing events and lives in being, I ask the
students to imagine all the various possibilities. With a little practice
in imagining things they have heretofore thought impossible,' 7 I find
unrestricted power of revocation, or presently exercisable power of appointment expires; and the
peculiar biology of the Rule.
I always use a diagram for working perpetuities problems and suggest to students that they do
the same. I insist that we include on the diagram all steps that actually will lead to vesting or
failure of the interest and that the diagram demonstrate how an interest actually could vest more
than 21 years after the deaths of all lives in being (if that is the case). My model diagram is
included in the Appendix, together with the handout I give students when we begin studying the
Rule.
15. In the first year Property course, I work only with physiological closing of the class,
leaving the rule of convenience for the wills and trusts course. Under the rule of convenience, a
class will close when the first member is entitled to call for distribution of her share, even though
the class has not yet closed physiologically.
16. If failure will result in a reversion, I also ask them to pose sequences that lead to failure.
Otherwise, I work with sequences that lead to vesting one or another of the future interests.
17. Professor Dukeminier's casebooks always delight students because of his wonderful sense
of humor and apt quotations. One of my favorites, which is particularly appropriate in teaching
this part of the Rule, is from L. Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (Ch. 5):
Vol. 65:323, 1990
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they readily identify sequences involving fertile octogenarians, preco-
cious toddlers, unborn widows and inexhaustible magic gravel pits.
Whenever we find any sequence for which there is no validating life, I
tell them we have found an interest that violates the common law
Rule. If there is any sequence, however unlikely, that would lead to
vesting of a future interest more than 21 years after the deaths of all
the lives in being at the effective date, that is enough to invalidate that
future interest, even if there are other sequences that would lead to
vesting in time.
Let me illustrate with a conveyance "to A for life, with remainder to
the first child of A to reach 25, and if no child of A reaches 25, to B."
At the time the gift is made A and B are both alive, and A has one
child, # 1 child, age 3. The gift creates two contingent remainders
subject to the Rule: the gift to the first child of A to reach 25, and the
alternative gift to B. The conditions precedent18 to the gift to the first
child of A to reach 25 are (1) birth, (2) survival to the age of 25, and
(3) being the first of A's children to reach 25. The condition precedent
to B's interest is that no child of A reaches the age of 25.
The events that will lead to vesting of the interest in a child of A are
either survival of the existing child to age 25, or birth of another child
who survives to age 25 and reaches that age before any other child of
A reaches 25. The events that will lead to vesting of the interest in B
are death of A, and death of all A's children before they reach age 25.
The possible sequences of these events causing vesting are as follows:
(1) A's #1 child reaches the age of 25 (vesting in #1 child).
(2) A's #1 child dies under the age of 25. A dies without having
any more children (vesting in B).
(3) A's #1 child dies under the age of 25. A has #2 child. #2
child reaches 25 (vesting in #2 child).
(4) A's #1 child dies under the age of 25. A has #2 child who dies
under the age of 25. A dies (vesting in B).
"Now I'll give you something to believe. I'm just one hundred and one, five months and a
day."
"I can't believe that!" said Alice.
"Can't you?" the Queen said in a pitying tone. "Try again: draw a long breath, and shut
your eyes."
Alice laughed. "There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe impossible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was your age, I
always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible
things before breakfast."
J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATFS 673 (3d ed. 1984).
18. Conditions precedent are those which must be met to ascertain the taker.
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(5) A's #1 and #2 children die under the age of 25. A has #3
child. #3 child reaches the age of 25, or sooner dies, and A does or does
not have more children who reach 25 or die before reaching 25 (vesting
in the child who reaches 25 or in B if none reaches 25).19
Note that in identifying the sequences that will lead to vesting of the
interests, I do not include anything that is not required by the terms of
the gift for vesting the interest. I do not include any time periods, for
example, other than a child's reaching 25. I do not specify whether a
child reaches 25 within X number of years of the death of A, or B, or
the # 1 child, because the vesting will take place under the terms of
the instrument whenever a child reaches 25. Since there is no require-
ment in the terms of the instrument that a child reach 25 within 21
years after A's death, or at any other time, I do not include any partic-
ular interval between A's death and the vesting. In marking sequences
of events on the time line diagram, however, I do insert an interval
greater than 21 years before the vesting event whenever possible.
Diagrams of the sequences on a time line look like this:
Sequence (1): A's # I child reaches the age of 25 (vesting in # 1 child).
A, B and everyone else in the world except # I child die1 # child reaches 25 (interest vests)
Validating life: # 1 child (if #1 child takes, she must do so in her own
lifetime, and she is a life in being).
19. These sequences could be extended indefinitely, but since the outcome is the same i
determining whether there is a validating life, I usually include only two. If anyone remain
unconvinced that they are all the same, more sequences can be run.
Vol. 65:323, 1990
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Sequence (2): A's # 1 child dies under the age of 25. A dies without
having any more children (vesting in B).
A, B, # 1 child and everyone else in the world die;I B's interest vests
Validating life: A (if A has no other children, interest must vest at his
death).
Sequence (3): A's #1 child dies under the age of 25. A has #2 child.
#2 child reaches 25 (vesting in #2 child).
#1 child, and B and everyone else except A die
A has #2 child and dies
#2 child reaches 25
Validating life: None (#2 child could reach 25 more than 21 years after
the deaths of all the others, including A and # 1 child).
329
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Sequence (4): A's #1 child dies under the age of 25. A has #2 child
who dies under the age of 25. A dies (vesting in B).
#1 child, B and everyone except A die.
A has #2 child and dies.
#2 child dies
Validating life: none (#2 child could die more than 21 years after deaths
of A and everybody else).
Sequence (5): A's #1 and #2 children die under the age of 25. A has
#3 child. #3 child reaches the age of 25, or sooner dies (vesting in #3
child or in B, depending on which happened).
# 1 child, B and everyone else except A die
A has #3 child and dies.
#3 child reaches 25 or dies
Validating life: None (#3 child could reach 25 more than 21 years after
deaths of A and everybody else).
Each future interest is tested separately under the Rule. For each
future interest, all possible vesting sequences must have a validating
life, or the future interest is void. In this conveyance there were two
future interests: the contingent remainder to the first child of A to
reach 25 and the alternative contingent remainder to B. Both future
interests are void under the common law Rule because there is at least
one sequence leading to vesting of each interest for which there is no
validating life. Even though sequences (1) and (2) do have validating
lives (those which would necessarily lead to vesting within 21 years
after lives in being), both gifts are bad because sequences (3), (4) and
(5) could lead to vesting more than 21 years after the deaths of all the
Vol. 65:323, 1990
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lives in being. Sequences (3) and (5) invalidate the remainder to a
child; sequences (4) and (5) invalidate the remainder to B.
Once I have gone through this process with one or two conveyances,
I usually turn it into a game called "Perpetuities Challenge." One
student or group of students are the "Challengers," another the
"Defenders." I put a conveyance on the board that includes a contin-
gent remainder or an executory interest. The Challengers begin the
game by suggesting a sequence of events that they think will result in
vesting of the interest more than 21 years after all the lives in being
have died. I mark the sequence out on the time line. The Defenders
then identify a person who was alive at the effective date, who is either
still alive, or who died within 21 years of the vesting date. The Chal-
lengers respond by killing that person. If the person can be killed
without affecting the date of the vesting or failure of the interest, play
returns to the Defenders who must then find another person who is
still alive, or who died within 21 years of the vesting. Play continues
with that sequence until it is clear whether there is a validating life for
the sequence. If the Defenders cannot come up with a validating life,
the Challengers score a point. If they can, the Defenders score, and
the Challengers must come up with another sequence.
Play continues until it is determined that there is a validating life for
every possible sequence, or that there is at least one sequence for
which there is no validating life. At that point we move on to another
disposition. I hand out a list of conveyances creating future interests
and suggest that they continue playing Perpetuities Challenge outside
of class to cement their understanding of the Rule.
The virtue of this method of teaching perpetuities analysis is that it
focuses the students' attention on what will cause vesting before it asks
whether the vesting necessarily will occur within 21 years after some
life in being. By asking them to identify the conditions that must be
met, and then the events that will meet them, it helps them to see all
the possibilities, including afterborns where that is possible. From lay-
ing out the sequences of vesting events, it is a fairly natural step to
identifying the validating lives, if there are any.
Although this method tends to reduce error by forcing explicit
attention to conditions precedent and class closing events, and by
helping students to see all the sequences of events that will lead to
vesting and failure of the interests, it does not eliminate errors. It asks
students the right questions, and takes them through the right steps,
but it does not guarantee that they will produce the right answers.
Some go astray because they misclassify the future interest initially;
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others fail to see that there are possible unborn beneficiaries, or that a
class member could call for a distribution before the class is biologi-
cally closed. There are lots of places where students can make mis-
takes, even if they are following the right process.
I like to think that widespread adoption of this method of teaching
the Rule would end its Reign of Terror, but it probably won't. For
even with this method, the Rule is not easy to understand, and stu-
dents will continue to struggle with it. More important, however, the
mythology of the Terrible Rule has such great power in American law
schools that I think nothing short of abolishing the Rule could end its
Reign of Terror.E"
II. ENDING THE PERPETUITIES WARS OF THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: A BETTER REFORM
PACKAGE
When Professor James Casner persuaded the American Law Insti-
tute to adopt the "wait and see principle" in 1979,2" he touched off a
new and ferocious round 2 in the Perpetuities War begun in 1952 by
20. Whether we should do that is touched on, but not resolved, in my third essay.
21. Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, Property, Tentative Draft No. 1-Part 1, 56
A.L.I. PROc. 466 (1980). The principle is stated in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY
(Donative Transfers) § 1.4 (1983). Wait and see was adopted by the Institute only after heated
debates at the 1978 and 1979 Annual Meetings. Those debates pitted Professor Powell, Reporter
for the First Restatement of Property, against Professor Casner, Reporter for the Second
Restatement, in what Professor Donahue called the Battle of the Titans. Continuation of
Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, Property, Tentative Draft No. 1, 55 A.L.I. PROC.
289 (1979). It is interesting to remember that Professor Powell brought Professor Casner into
the American Law Institute in 1935 to work as an associate reporter for the First Restatement
while Casner was still a graduate student at Columbia. Siding with Powell in the debates were
Professors Lusky, Berger and Rohan. Professors Stein, Donahue, Maudsley and Heckerling
sided with Casner.
22. After the adoption of wait and see by the Institute, Professor Lawrence Waggoner of
Michigan and Professor Jesse Dukeminier of UCLAjoined the fray. They have since become the
principal protagonists. Professor Waggoner published Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1718 (1983) [hereinafter Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform], and then Professor Dukeminier
published Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985) [hereinafter
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives]. The two continued with Waggoner,
Perpetuities: 4 Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1714 (1985); Dukeminier, A
Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1730 (1985); Waggoner, A Rejoinder by
Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (1985); and Dukeminier, A Final Comment by
Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1742 (1985). The exchange grew even more heated
with Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo,
supra note 7, and Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of
the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988) [hereinafter Waggoner, The
Uniform Statutory Rule]. Their struggle continues in state law revision commissions and state
legislatures considering adoption of the Uniform Act.
332
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his former colleague, Professor Barton Leach.23 The war was begun
over the question how and not whether the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities should be modified.24 Although some have quarreled
with Professor Leach over the extent of the problem caused by the
Rule in its traditional form, no one disagrees with his basic premise
that the common law Rule goes too far in striking down reasonable
dispositions because of remote and fantastical possibilities.
In the first War, the major battlefield was the "wait and see" princi-
ple, named by Professor Leach, and carefully expounded and refined
by Professor Dukeminier.25 Opponents of wait and see claimed that
the doctrine is unnecessary, and that in most of its forms it is incoher-
ent because there is no principled way to determine the length of the
waiting period within the framework of the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities.26 Instead of wait and see, opponents led by Professor
Lewis Simes proposed adoption of limited, specific statutory reforms
tailored to eliminate particular violations of the Rule.27 Some also
advocated statutory grants of cy pres powers to permit judicial refor-
mation of instruments that violate the Rule.2"
In drafting the Restatement Second of Property, Donative Transfers,
Professor Casner incorporated an expanded version of wait and see
into his statement of the common law Rule.29 When his position car-
ried the day at the American Law Institute, wait and see received a
tremendous boost. The Uniform Law Commissioners undertook prep-
aration of a Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities based on the
principle of wait and see. Under the leadership of the Reporter, Pro-
23. Leach, supra note 8, at 730.
24. The Perpetuities Wars have engaged some of the best minds and most distinguished
scholars working in the property field in the second half of the 20th century. Like most wars,
this one has generated a lot of intemperate language and strained relations among the
combatants, but it also has released a lot of creative energy. Professor Bloom recounts the
history and lists the major protagonists in Bloom, supra note 9.
25. J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN ACTION (1962); Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The
Measuring Lives, supra note 22; Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, supra note 3.
26. See Bloom, supra note 9; Fletcher, Basic Clarity, supra note 2, for recent thorough
critiques of the wait and see doctrine in all its forms.
27. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 78-79 (1955). The New York statutes
provide the model for later reformers of this school. See Bloom, supra note 9, at 66 n.258, 67
n.261.
28. Professor Bloom in his Perpetuities Refinement article, supra note 9, gives a
comprehensive account of these reforms.
29. Restatement § 1.3 provides a list of measuring lives to be used if there is no life in being
within which (or within 21 years after its end) the interest will necessarily vest or fail. The list
includes the transferor, anyone who owns a beneficial interest in the property in which the future
interest is created, whether vested or contingent, and the parents and grandparents of all owners
of beneficial interests in the property. It also includes the donee of a power of appointment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 1.3 (1983).
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fessor Waggoner, the Uniform Act expanded wait and see again, and
finally converted it from a doctrine based on "measuring lives" to a
simple 90-year time period.3 °
When the Uniform Act was approved in 1986, it appeared that wait
and see had won the war. However, the expansion and conversion of
the wait and see doctrine worked by Professors Casner and Waggoner
provoked sharp dissension in the ranks of wait and see proponents.
Professor Dukeminier has staunchly maintained that the measuring
lives can be determined within the logic of the common law Rule.3"
Professor Waggoner has been equally vehement in contending that
there is no principled method of selecting measuring lives this way.3 2
The ferocity of this round in the Perpetuities Wars has given new hope
to those who would reform the Rule without wait and see, and has
spurred me to search for an alternative reform package that might
prove acceptable to both sides.3 3
Opposition to the Uniform Act34 centers on its use of an alternate
90-year period, which can either be used by a drafter as a period in
gross, or by the intended beneficiaries of an interest that violates the
common law Rule as the wait and see period. The primary objection
to the 90-year period is that it is likely to encourage the use of long-
term trusts, which will lead to increased dead hand control of property
in the United States.35 Proponents of the Uniform Act respond that
use of some arbitrary time period is necessary in an effective wait and
see regime, and claim that reducing the perpetuities violations in trust
instruments drafted for ordinary people 36 will not lead to an increase
in dead hand control in any event. Neither side has taken the position
30. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, 20 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 7.03 (1985); Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986). Professor Waggoner also
advocated changing the underlying rationale for reform from mitigating the harshness of the
common law Rule to preventing the unjust enrichment that ensues from invalidity of interests
under the Rule. See Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 22.
31. See Articles cited supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. I have found this War particularly painful as I respect and admire the work of both
Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner, and consider myself in intellectual debt to both of them.
34. Opposition to the Uniform Act is comprehensively covered by Bloom, supra note 9, and
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, supra
note 7. I will not elaborate further here, but instead refer the interested reader to those articles.
35. There is also opposition to the Uniform Act's reformation provision because it requires
waiting until events have shown that the interest will not vest within 21 years after any life in
being before reformation can take place. Secondarily, there is objection to its undermining of the
common law Rule while purporting to leave it in effect.
36. Those who cannot afford or are not lucky enough to find lawyers skilled enough to draft
within the common law Rule.
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that an extension of dead hand control would be desirable, a possibil-
ity I raise in my third essay.
The growing opposition to the Uniform Act from friends and foes of
wait and see has slowed its momentum,37 raising the question whether
this might be an appropriate time to propose a peace treaty. In all the
furor over the merits of wait and see and various specific statutory
reforms of the common law Rule, little attention has been paid to the
"Rule of Discrete Invalidity," a simple and elegant judicial reform of
the common law Rule that Dad proposed in 1968.11 In a recent article
in this Review,39 he again called our attention to that proposal. In that
article, he also demonstrated that his method of analysis, focusing on
the sequences of events that lead to vesting, yields a ready method of
identifying the lives to be used for a wait and see measuring period
without departing from the strict logic of the common law Rule. It
also channels reformation efforts productively by precisely identifying
the alternatives available within the dispositive scheme. From those
ideas, a very attractive reform package can be constructed.
The discrete invalidity principle substantially limits the problems
caused by the common law Rule without causing any distortion in its
underlying logic. It should be embraced by all reformers, regardless of
their other persuasions. Coupled with a wait and see regime strictly
limited within the logic of the common law Rule and immediately
available reformation, it offers a complete package for curing the defi-
ciencies of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. I think it com-
prises the best reform package currently on the market. It eliminates
the problems caused by the excesses of the common law Rule without
departing from its underlying rigor or logic; it does not destroy any
interests unnecessarily; and finally, it can be implemented by judges in
their continuing evolution of the common law, as well as by statute.4°
37. Only four states are listed as having adopted the act as of early 1988: Florida, Minnesota,
Nevada, and South Carolina. UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8A U.L.A.
132 (Supp. 1989).
The California Law Revision Commission has circulated letters from Professors McGovern,
Bird, Bloom, Maxwell, and Whitebread opposing enactment of the Uniform Act. Professor
Bloom states in his letter to the Commission that he has received letters supporting his
opposition to the Uniform Act from a "substantial number" of law professors. Copies of the
letters are on file with Washington Law Review.
38. Fletcher, Discrete Invalidity, supra note 2.
39. Fletcher, Basic Clarity, supra note 2.
40. In result, this package is not too different from the package of specific statutory reforms
proposed by Professor Bloom. However, it is better in at least two respects. It can be used by
courts and lawyers in states where the legislature has not acted. In addition, it does not require
destruction of the interests of the unborn widow and afterborn children to the extent that
Professor Bloom's statutory rules of exclusionary construction do. As I explain below, the
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If retention of the common law Rule's basic method of curbing dead
hand control is desirable, this package offers the best way to get rid of
the common law Rule's excesses while retaining its virtues.
The first element of the package is the rule of discrete invalidity, or
doctrine of alternative gifts.4" To adopt it, a court need only overrule
or reject Proctor v. Bishop of Bath & Wells,4 2 an English case decided
in 1794. Twentieth century American courts are free to reject eight-
eenth century English precedents, and American cases based on those
precedents, when the results no longer fit contemporary society.43
In Proctor, the court held invalid a bequest to B if no son of A
became a clergyman." The bequest violated the common law Rule
because it was possible for A to have a son after the death of the testa-
tor, who would live 21 years longer than everyone else alive at the
effective date, and then die without having become a clergyman.
Although it was also possible that A would die without ever having a
son, which in fact is what happened, the court refused to recognize the
implicit alternative gift to B in the event A died without ever having
had a son. The court acknowledged that the alternative gift was inher-
ent in the gift that was made, but stated that if the testator had not
separated the contingencies, the court would not do it for him.45
This decision greatly extended the reach of the common law Rule to
sweep in many dispositions that could have been given effect without
tying up property longer than lives in being plus 21 years. It is consis-
tent with other decisions of the time, like those establishing the con-
clusive presumption of fertility,46 and the all or nothing rule for class
gifts, 47 but it lacks the practical justifications underlying the others.48
It is consistent with the linguistic formalism of the times and did avoid
unborn widow can take without disturbing the remainder to the life tenant's issue so long as
there is some taker who was a life in being. If there is not, the instrument can be reformed to
permit all those born within 21 years after the life tenant's death to take. This approach is thus
less destructive of the original dispositive plan than a statute mandating construction to eliminate
an afterborn widow.
41. Professor Dukeminier uses this label. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 17, at
794-95.
42. 126 Eng. Rep. 594 (C.P. 1794).
43. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
44. 126 Eng. Rep. at 596. The bequest to B was an alternative to a bequest to the first son of
A to become a clergyman.
45. Id.
46. Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
47. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
48. The conclusive presumption of fertility avoids the need to determine on a case by case
basis who in fact can have children, a decision which in the eighteenth century would have been
much more problematic than today. The class gift rule avoids the problem of treating unequally
persons equally related to the donor and reduces the need for infectious invalidity litigation.
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the need for courts to do something that might have looked like
adding language to a will, but primarily it served to confirm that con-
veyancing was an art confined to the few, and to extend the reach of
the Rule. By refusing to recognize the separate contingencies or alter-
native gifts inherent in many gifts of future interests, the court greatly
increased the swath of destruction wreaked by the Rule.
Since the result of Proctor is simply to extend the reach of the com-
mon law Rule to invalidate dispositions that would be valid if the
donor had used a more elaborate form of expression, there is no reason
it should be retained as part of modem law. Whatever led eighteenth
century judges to their decisions extending the destructive reach of the
Rule Against Perpetuities as far as possible without abandoning the
ostensible position that interests vesting within 21 years after a life in
being were permissible, is not operating in modem America. Ameri-
can commentators universally call for curbing the excesses of the
Rule.4 9 The rule of Proctor is not essential to retaining the core of the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities; rather it extends the reach of
the Rule beyond the point required by modem conditions, and even to
the point where it offends modem sensibilities. A twentieth century
lawyer should have little difficulty persuading a twentieth century
judge that Proctor can safely be relegated to history.5"
Rejecting the rule of Proctor would permit American courts to avoid
invalidating most future interests that fall to the Rule because of the
presence of possible unborn widows, fertile octogenarians, and preco-
cious toddlers. Recognizing the alternative gifts inherent in many gifts
of future interests would permit them to validate those which are sure
to vest within lives in being plus 21 years, voiding only those which are
not. If wait and see is accepted in the jurisdiction, separately identify-
ing the gifts that will vest in time permits more precise identification of
the instances where waiting is necessary, and allows immediate identi-
fication of those which are valid without waiting. Separate identifica-
tion of invalid gifts also permits more precise direction of actions for
reformation to the invalid gifts.
Application of the discrete invalidity principle requires recognition
of the alternative gifts inherent in gifts of future interests. This can be
most easily done by the method of analysis described in my first essay.
From the conditions precedent stated by the donor and the classes
49. See, eg., Bloom, supra note 9, at 63.
50. Arguments that there are reliance interests worthy of protection should be unsuccessful
except in what would be a very rare case of the beneficiary who can plausibly argue justifiable
reliance on the court's unwillingness to split contingencies. If that case arose, the court could
resort to prospective overruling.
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named as takers, you determine what events will be necessary to pro-
duce vesting in the takers identified by the donor. If more than one
sequence of events can lead to vesting, you treat each sequence as a
separate gift. Each sequence for which there is a validating life is a
valid gift; only those sequences for which there is no validating life are
void. If you are going to wait and see, you only wait to see whether
the valid or invalid sequence is going to take place. If you are going to
reform the instrument, you reform only to cure the problems with the
invalid sequences. Reformation can take place at any time that it
appears that an invalid sequence, rather than a valid one, is actually
going to take place, or whenever certainty as to ultimate ownership is
desired. To understand how the discrete invalidity principle works, it
is helpful to apply it to some particular cases. I will begin with Proc-
tor, then take up Jee v. Audley,5 t the fertile octogenarian case, and
then finally, the case of the unborn widower.
Case 1: In Proctor v. Bishop of Bath & Wells,5" the gift was to the
first son of A to become a clergyman, but if none, to B. A and B were
alive at the testator's death and A had no sons. Looking at the interest
of the first son of A to become a clergyman, we can identify three
conditions precedent: (1) a son must be born, and (2) must become a
clergyman, (3) before any other son does so. Looking at the interest of
B, we identify one condition: that no son of A becomes a clergyman.
There are three possible sequences that would lead to vesting of the
interest in a son of A or failure of that interest, with vesting in B:5 3
(1) A has a son who becomes a clergyman (vesting in the son; no
validating life because afterborn son could become a clergyman more
than 21 years after death of A, B, and everyone else alive at the effective
date).
(2) A has a son (or sons), none of whom becomes a clergyman (vest-
ing in B; no validating life because all afterborn sons might die without
having become clergymen more than 21 years after deaths of A, B, and
everyone else. B is not required to survive to take).
51. 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
52. 126 Eng. Rep. 594, 595 (C.P. 1794).
53. Dad and I part company here. He would include as separate sequences those in which a
child of A becomes a clergyman before and after reaching the age of 21. For any sequence in
which a child became a clergyman before reaching the age of 21, A could serve as the validating
life. I have resisted this suggestion on the ground that the conditions precedent do not require
becoming a clergyman before any particular age or prohibit it after any particular age. The
difference in practical terms is which interests are valid ab initio and which require waiting or
reformation. I think it is simpler to confine those declared valid ab initio to those meeting
conditions required by the donor and not parsing them into whether they are met more or less
than 21 years after the taker is born.
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(3) A never has a son (vesting in B; A is validating life because vest-
ing must take place at A's death).
Subjecting each of these sequences to a perpetuities analysis, we see
that there is a validating life only for sequence (3). Since there is no
validating life for either sequence where A has a son after the effective
date of the gift, neither the gift to A's first son to become a clergyman,
nor the alternative gift to B in the event A has sons who do not become
clergymen is valid. However, the gift to B ifA never has a son is good.
The rule of discrete invalidity treats each of these sequences as a sepa-
rate gift. Invalidity of gifts (1) and (2) does not cause invalidity of gift
(3).54
Standing alone, adoption of the discrete invalidity principle permits
effectuation of the donor's intent if A dies without having had sons. It
does nothing, however, for the case where A does have a son.
To save the gifts to the son, or to B if the son does not become a
clergyman, wait and see or reformation is necessary. If reformation is
available without waiting, the instrument could be reformed immedi-
ately to provide that the gift goes to the first son of A to become a
clergyman within 21 years after the death of A, and if none, to B. It
also could be reformed to provide that the son would take if he became
a clergyman within 21 years after the death of either A or B. How-
ever, if we are going to reform to include an extraneous life such as
B's, we should probably also reform to require that B survive, and
provide an alternative gift in the event he does not.55 If there is no
need for an immediate determination of the validity of B's interest,
however, nothing need be done until A has a son because B's interest,
contingent on A's death without having had a son, is valid from the
beginning.
Under a wait and see regime, we would wait to see if A has a son. If
he does not, there is no need for anything further-B takes. If A does
have a son, then we need to wait to see if the son's interest will vest in
time. The question of how long to wait is an interesting one, and one
over which there can be some disagreement. With respect to the inter-
54. Adoption of the discrete invalidity principle does not prevent invalidation of alternative
gifts on the infectious invalidity principle.
55. One problem with instruments that violate the Rule Against Perpetuities is that they are
likely to have other drafting problems. Failure to include a survival condition to B's interest is
obviously bad drafting in current conditions because it requires inclusion of the executory
interest in B's estate which leads to additional taxes and administrative expenses. If the court is
going to reform the instrument at all, it also should fix this problem by substituting an alternative
gift to B's issue or B's heirs or devisees in the event B fails to survive. See French, Implying
Conditions of Survival, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 801 (1985).
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est of any particular son, A's life becomes irrelevant once the son is
born. That would lead to the conclusion that you should wait only
until 21 years after the son's birth to see if he had yet become a clergy-
man. If he had not, reformation would be needed to save the gift to
that son.5 6 However, if A has another son, that son, too, could take
the gift if he were the first to become a clergyman. That would lead to
the conclusion that you would wait 21 years after the birth of the first
son to see whether that son had become a clergyman or whether A had
given birth to another son. If a second son had been born, you would
wait 21 years after his birth to see if he became a clergyman. If the
first son becomes a clergyman during that period, he should be permit-
ted to take, even if it happens more than 21 years after his own birth.
There are two rationales for permitting the first son to take without
reformation, even if he becomes a clergyman at an age beyond 21, but
before a later born son reaches 21: either that his becoming a clergy-
man would prevent the condition precedent for the later sons from
being satisfied; or that, since you are waiting anyway, there is no rea-
son to invalidate the gift to the first son on the basis of something that
might have happened, but did not (death of A immediately after the
first son's birth). Since A could produce a son who would become a
clergyman and take the gift so long as A is alive and no son has yet
become a clergyman, the waiting period should extend until 21 years
after A's death, whenever it occurs.5 7 If at that time the interest has
not yet vested in a son of A, the instrument should be reformed to give
it to B, or B's successors, if that has not already been done. If B is still
alive, or died after A, the instrument could be reformed to provide that
the first son of A to become a clergyman within 21 years of B's death
should take the property, and if none becomes a clergyman, to B or
B's successors. Alternatively, the instrument could be reformed to
provide that B or B's successors take the property 21 years after A's
death, if no son of A has yet become a clergyman.
56. Reformation most likely would take the form of "to that son of A if he becomes a
clergyman within 21 years of A's death."
57. Here I part company with Dad and side with Professor Dukeminier. Dad insists that the
validity of each taker's interest be judged solely on the basis of the sequence of events that leads
to vesting in him, and that all lives extraneous to that process be removed as soon as they become
extraneous. Thus, the waiting period for each son can be only 21 years after his own birth
because A's life thereafter is extraneous to vesting in that son. It seems to me, however, that as
long as there is any sequence that could still take place which requires continuance of A's life,
you would permit waiting in any sequence that is not foreclosed by the continuance of A's life. In
other words, I would regard as relevant lives all those necessarily involved in any sequence of
events which could still take place.
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Case 2: Jee v. Audley58 involved a gift to Mary Hall in fee, but if her
line of descendants ran out, to the then living daughters of John and
Elizabeth Gee. The conditions precedent to the executory interest of
the daughters of John and Elizabeth Gee are (1) death of the last
descendant of Mary Hall, (2) birth of class members, and (3) survival
to the death of the last descendant of Mary Hall. Class closing will
take place at the death of John or Elizabeth, physiologically, and,
under the rule of convenience, when Mary Hall's line dies out. At the
effective date, Mary Hall had no issue, and John and Elizabeth Gee
were alive, of advanced age, and had 4 living daughters.
The variables that will affect vesting are:
(1) Mary Hall will or will not have a surviving descendant when she
dies.
(2) John and Elizabeth will or will not have another daughter before
one of them dies.
(3) A daughter of John and Elizabeth will or will not survive until
the death of Mary Hall's last descendant.
Put into sequences, we find the following possibilities:
(1) Mary Hall dies without a surviving descendant. John and Eliza-
beth do have another daughter. A daughter of John and Elizabeth is
alive at Mary Hall's death. (Validating life is Mary Hall because vesting
takes place at her death).
(2) Mary Hall dies with a surviving descendant. John and Elizabeth
Gee do not have another daughter. A daughter of John and Elizabeth is
alive at the death of Mary Hall's last descendant. (Validating life is the
daughter of John and Elizabeth who takes the interest because she was a
life in being and had to survive to take).
(3) Mary Hall dies with a surviving descendant. John and Elizabeth
do have another daughter. One of the four daughters of John and Eliza-
beth living at the testator's death is alive at the death of Mary Hall's last
descendant. (Validating life is the surviving daughter of John and Eliza-
beth who was alive at the effective date).
(4) Mary Hall dies with a surviving descendant. John and Elizabeth
do have another daughter. The only daughter of John and Elizabeth
alive at the death of Mary Hall's last descendant is the afterborn daugh-
ter. (No validating life because vesting can take place more than 21
years after the deaths of Mary Hall, John and Elizabeth, the 4 daughters
who were alive at the effective date, and everyone else who was alive at
the effective date).
58. 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
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Of these four sequences, three will be valid under the discrete inva-
lidity principle. Only the gift to the afterborn daughter of John and
Elizabeth is void, and it is void only if none of the four daughters alive
at the effective date survives to the vesting event. The gifts to the
daughters of John and Elizabeth Gee surviving at the death of Mary
Hall, if Mary Hall then dies without issue, are valid, as are the gifts to
the daughters, if any of the four living at the death of the testator
survives. Since it is highly unlikely that John and Elizabeth will have
an afterborn daughter, there is no need to reform the instrument ini-
tially or to wait and see. All of the interests that any of the living
claimants could take are valid from the beginning.
If John and Elizabeth do have another daughter, and if Mary Hall
does have issue, there is still no need to wait and see, or to reform the
instrument. Only if the other four daughters of John and Elizabeth
die while a descendant of Mary Hall is still alive, is there a problem
with the afterborn daughter's interest. If this happens, she could wait
to see whether the last descendant of Mary Hall dies within 21 years
after the deaths of Mary Hall, the first to die of John or Elizabeth,59
and the last survivor of the four daughters who were lives in being. If
so, her interest is valid. If not, she would need to seek reformation. If
the daughter wanted earlier certainty as to the validity of her interest,
she could seek reformation at any time after her birth.
Case 3: The unborn widower: "to daughter for life, remainder to
her widower for life, remainder to her children who survive the wid-
ower." At the effective date, the daughter is married to # 1 husband
and has # 1 child. The conditions precedent to the widower's remain-
der are (1) birth, (2) marriage to the daughter and (3) survival of the
daughter being still married at the time of her death. Since all
sequences leading to vesting of the interest of the widower terminate at
the daughter's death, the widower's interest is valid under the tradi-
tional common law Rule.
The conditions precedent to the childrens' remainders are (1) birth,
and (2) survival of the widower, if any. The possible sequences of
events leading to vesting in children of the daughter are as follows:
(1) Daughter dies survived by # 1 husband and #1 child; widower
dies survived by # 1 child. (Vesting in # 1 child; validating lives are # 1
husband and # 1 child).
59. John and Elizabeth are relevant lives only so long as both are living because the daughter
must be a child of both. Once one of them has died, the other becomes an extraneous life, usable
for reformation but not for wait and see.
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(2) Daughter has #2 child and dies survived by # 1 husband and
children; widower dies survived by #2 child. (Vesting in #2 child;
validating life is #1 husband).
(3) X is born, Daughter divorces # 1 husband, marries X, has child
#2 and dies survived by X, X dies survived by #1 and #2 children.
(Vesting in # 1 and #2 children; validating life is #1 child).
(4) X is born, # 1 husband dies, Daughter marries X and has #2
child, #1 child dies, X dies, survived by #2 child. (Vesting in #2
child; no validating life, X could survive Daughter and #1 child by
more than 21 years).
Of these sequences, only (4) lacks a validating life. Applying the
rule of discrete invalidity, the only invalid remainder to the children of
D would be the remainder to an afterborn child of D on the death of
D's widower, if the widower was an afterborn, and if he was not sur-
vived by any child of D born before the effective date. Remainders to
all children in the event a child alive at the effective date is one of the
takers, and to all children in the event the widower was alive at the
effective date, are valid.
Under a wait and see regime, you would wait until the death of the
daughter to determine whether she had a widower who was an
afterborn, and afterborn children. If there is a widower who is an
afterborn and there is an afterborn child, then you would wait until
the death of the widower or the #1 child, whichever first occurred.
Only if the widower outlived the #1 child would you know that the
only remaining vesting sequence is one which could lead to vesting
more than 21 years after the deaths of the lives in being. At that point,
you could wait for 21 more years to see if the widower or the afterborn
child had died. If not, the interest is void. Reform should provide
that in the event of an afterborn widower, the afterborn child takes
only if a child of the daughter, who was a life in being, survived the
death of the widower, or the widower died within 21 years of the
deaths of the daughter and the child who was a life in being.
As in the case of the tertile octogenarian, the discrete invalidity
principle, standing alone, limits invalidity under the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities to the future interest contingent on the widower's
birth after the effective date. It limits the destruction to an interest
that is not likely to materialize, leaving intact most of the disposition
desired by the donor. It is better than the statutory provision directing
construction to exclude an afterborn child or widow, because it does
not prevent them from taking if they materialize, and invalidates their
interests, or the interests dependent on them for vesting, only if there
is no vesting sequence in which they play a part that can vest in time.
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Whenever the event that causes invalidity under the common law
Rule is one that is unlikely to occur, like the birth of a child to John
and Elizabeth Jee, or the marriage to the unborn widower, adoption of
the discrete invalidity principle solves the problem of frustrated donor
intent without the need to wait to see what actually happens, and
without the need to reform the instrument to eliminate the possibility
that the interest might vest in an afterborn. The Rule simply says that
the executory interest held by the afterborn on the contingency that
the vesting event occurs after the death of Mary Hall, and after the
death of the four living daughters, is void. Since it is highly unlikely
that this interest would ever vest, no harm is done by declaring it inva-
lid at the outset. Likewise, no harm is done by declaring all the other
executory interests (those which will vest at the death of Mary Hall or
in the lifetime of any of the four living daughters) valid at the outset.
If the dispositive scheme does not violate the policy of the common
law Rule, use of the discrete invalidity principle prunes the excesses of
the common law Rule and permits the testator's intent to be carried
out. The parties do not need to wait to find out whether their interests
are valid, nor do they need to reform the instrument.
If the event that causes invalidity under the common law Rule is
likely to occur, as the birth of a son to A in Proctor, or if the event has
no inherent time limit, as in a gift "to A if the war ends," or if the
event is survival to an age in excess of 21, the relief provided by the
rule of discrete invalidity is limited. It cuts back the need to wait and
see or reform the instrument to situations where the valid sequences
become impossible, leaving only invalid sequences, or where certainty
by the takers under invalid sequences is desired. However, it does not
validate gifts under invalid sequences which could result in vesting
later than 21 years after lives in being. To validate those gifts which in
fact vest within 21 years after the death of some life in being, and to
cure those which would in fact vest later than 21 years after the deaths
of the lives in being, reformation, or a combination of reformation and
wait and see, is necessary.
Reformation alone could be used to eliminate all perpetuities viola-
tions. However, it is the most expensive remedy since it requires judi-
cial action. The discrete invalidity principle operates automatically,
validating some interests immediately without the need for any judi-
cial action.6" Reformation coupled with discrete invalidity provides a
60. This, of course, assumes that lawyers and judges can be taught to understand the Rule so
that litigation establishing valid and invalid sequences will not be necessary, an assumption
which will not hold all of the time. But even if there are some cases brought because of the
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better solution than reformation alone, but the package is improved by
adding wait and see because wait and see also can be used without the
need for judicial action. Using wait and see to find out whether the
events in invalid sequences actually happen before 21 years have
elapsed from the deaths of the relevant lives in being is cheaper than
bringing a reformation action. If reformation is available from the
outset, as I think it should be, the availability of wait and see, as well
as reformation, provides beneficiaries the maximum flexibility in
choosing between cost and certainty.
A few more examples will illustrate the cases in which discrete inva-
lidity is usefully supplemented by wait and see and reformation, and to
illustrate how both doctrines can be cabined and channeled by the
logic lying behind the discrete invalidity principle.
Case 4: No inherent time limit: "To A if the war (pick any war)
ends." The only condition precedent to vesting is ending of the war.
The only possible sequences are that the war continues or the war
ends. There is no validating life for either sequence, since the war will
not necessarily end within 21 years of anyone's life.61 Wait and see
possibility that the judge can be led into a misunderstanding of the Rule, the frequency of
litigation will certainly be less than under a pure reformation regime.
61. At this point, it is very tempting to say that the possible sequences include one in which
the war ends within 21 years of the effective date. If they did, A's gift contingent on the war's
ending within 21 years is good, all the others are void. The problem, however, is that the donor
did not include any time contingency, and there is none necessarily included in the events leading
to vesting or failure of the interest. The discrete invalidity principle does not permit you to
create sequences that include contingencies beyond those necessarily included in the vesting
events specified by the donor.
This point is sometimes difficult to understand. Why can't we say that there is almost always a
possibility that the vesting events will occur within 21 years of the effective date or within 21
years after the death of some life in being? Why don't we state that there is a contingency in all
gifts which says the taker takes if all vesting events occur within 21 years?
At one level, the reason is that the time limit is not a contingency necessarily included within
the vesting events spelled out by the donor, and our proposed principle of discrete invalidity
permits us to separate only those contingencies included by the donor expressly or by necessary
implication. On another level, the reason is that if we did this, we would run into the same
problem that proponents of wait and see have encountered: there is no principled place to stop,
short of including sequences in which the vesting takes place 21 years after the death of any
person who was alive at the effective date. Once you permit the inclusion of an irrelevant or
extraneous life, there is no logical place to stop. There is no distinction between the sequences in
which the war ends 21 years after the death of A, within 21 years after the death of the last
survivor ofA's family members living at the effective date, and 21 years after the death of the last
person in the world alive at the effective date. The continued existence of all of these lives is
irrelevant to vesting.
If we believe that the gift to A should be valid if the war ends within 21 years of the effective
date, or within 21 years after the death of someone or some group of people, we must either
reform the instrument to read in a time condition, or we must change the common law Rule
more radically than by simply rejecting the Proctor rule. The principle of discrete invalidity does
not solve the frustrated donor intent problems posed by gifts that have no inherent time limits.
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will permit us to wait for 21 years to see whether the war has ended.
If it ends within 21 years, A takes the property. If it does not, refor-
mation is needed to save the gift to A. Reformation might appropri-
ately take the form of giving the property to A if the war ended within
her lifetime, or if it ended within 21 years of her death, giving the
property to her issue, or heirs or devisees.
Age contingencies in excess of 21 years also create problems that
require reformation or wait and see for satisfactory resolution.
Case 5: Take the case of the gift to the first child of A to reach age
25, if none, to B. At the time the gift is made A and B are alive and A
has # 1 child. The possible sequences are:
(1) # 1 child reaches 25. (Vesting in #1 child; validating life is #1
child).
(2) # 1 child dies, A has child #2, child #2 reaches age 25. (Vest-
ing in #2 child; no validating life because #2 child could reach 25
more than 21 years after the deaths of A and the # 1 child).
(3) #1 child dies, A has #2 child, #2 child dies, A has #3 child,
#3 child dies under 25, A has no more children. (Vesting in B, no
validating life because death of #3 child could take place more than 21
years after deaths of A, B, and # 1 child).
(4) # 1 child dies, A dies without having further children. (Vesting
in B, A is validating life).
The discrete invalidity principle declares sequences (1) and (4) valid,
leaving any sequence in which A has a child after the effective date
invalid, except the one in which the #1 child survives to 25 and
becomes the taker. No gift to an afterborn child is valid. If the #1
child reaches 25, the # 1 child takes without any need for wait and see
or reformation. Likewise, if #1 child dies under 25 and A dies with-
out having had another child, B takes under the valid gift. However, if
#1 child dies under 25 and A has an additional child, either wait and
see or reformation is necessary to permit either B or an afterborn child
of A to take. Since we will not know whether A will produce a child
who could live to 25 until a child has reached 25, or A's death if no
child has yet reached 25, we must wait until a child reaches 25 or A
sooner dies to find out. If at the time of A's death there is no child
under the age of 4, the interests of all children between 4 and 25 are
valid, as is the alternative gift to B, since all must vest or fail within 21
years of A's death. Only if at A's death there is a child under the age
of 4 will reformation be needed. At that point, the interests could be
Wait and see validates the gift to A if the war ends within 21 years; reformation is necessary to
validate the gift under any other circumstances.
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reformed to provide that the child takes if it reaches the age of 21, and
if it dies under that age, to B, or to B's issue or heirs or devisees.
Standing alone, adoption of the principle of discrete invalidity elimi-
nates the problems caused by postponement of vesting until an event
which could possibly, but is highly unlikely to take place more than 21
years after the deaths of all the lives in being. The circumstance that
could cause the vesting event to occur too late is usually the appear-
ance of an afterborn. Simply declaring that the interest in the
afterborn (or attendant on death of the afterborn), if such a person
appears, is void will cause little inconvenience or intent frustration
because the person is not likely to appear. The cases of the fertile
octogenarian, the unborn widow, and the precocious toddler are easily
disposed of without the need for special statutory canons of construc-
tion, wait and see, or reformation.
Adoption of the principle of discrete invalidity would -not disturb
the strict internal logic of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
Nor would it interfere with settled expectations. There is no constitu-
ency in favor of destroying gifts because the drafter failed to anticipate
the possibilities of fertile octogenarians, unborn widows, or precocious
toddlers. If proof is needed that such a reform would not be contro-
versial, one needs only look to the states where the same results have
been achieved by legislation requiring that these possibilities be
ignored in the construction of instruments.62 In states without such
legislation, courts should not hesitate to solve the problem by adopting
the principle of discrete invalidity as a modification to application of
the common law Rule. The eighteenth century rule of Proctor no
longer serves any useful purpose and twentieth century judges should
eliminate it from the common law.
For those who are interested in a more complete reform of the
excesses of the common law rule, a combination of discrete invalidity,
wait and see measured by lives necessarily involved in the sequences of
events leading to vesting, and reformation informed by sound drafting
practices and accepted limits of dead hand control provides an attrac-
tive package. I believe that the entire package, not just the discrete
invalidity element, can be adopted by judges without the need for leg-
islation. American commentators generally agree on the desirability
of achieving the results I have described in this essay.63 There is no
longer any constituency, if ever there was one, in favor of a remorse-
62. See Bloom, supra note 9 at 66-73, for suggested statutory reforms and the existing statutes
on which they are niodeled.
63. Bloom, supra note 9, at 63.
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less application of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, and
there are sufficient precedents to permit a common law judge exercis-
ing common law powers to adopt both wait and see and judicial refor-
mation without trespassing on fields appropriately left to the
legislature.' The Rule Against Perpetuities was created by judges and
it should be adapted to modem conditions by judges. This reform
package provides them with a way to carry out their responsibility
strictly within the common law tradition.6" I hope it also will provide
a package that could serve as the basis for a peace treaty to end the
Perpetuities Wars of the Late Twentieth Century.
III. WHY NOT A 90-YEAR TRUST? WHAT'S SO BAD
ABOUT DEAD HAND CONTROL, ANYWAY?
Everyone involved in the current Perpetuities Wars embraces the
idea that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities strikes the right
balance between permitting people to tie up their own property into
the future and preventing them from doing it for too long. A major
subject of contention between professors Dukeminier and Waggoner
in the current Perpetuities Wars, however, is the question whether the
Uniform Act changes the balance struck by the common law Rule.
Professor Dukeminier takes the position that the Uniform Act's adop-
tion will radically extend the amount of property subject to dead hand
control in America.66 Professor Waggoner as emphatically denies that
the extension is significant.67
Professor Dukeminier strongly opposes the Uniform Act on two dif-
ferent, but related grounds. He believes that very few trusts drafted
under existing law will last for 90 years. He predicts that adoption of
the Uniform Act will encourage the use of 90-year trusts, and trigger
widespread marketing of 90-year trusts by financial services vendors.
As a result, the amount of property held in trust will be greatly
increased, which he believes is socially undesirable because trust prop-
erty is subject to dead hand control.
64. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 17, at 843-60, contains a sampling of judicial
opinions adopting wait and see and equitable reformation as matters of common law. To those
can be added the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers), §§ 25.1-30.2
(1983) as support for common law adoption of wait and see.
65. For those who are less sanguine about the willingness of judges to take responsibility for
keeping the common law in shape, and more optimistic about the value of legislative reform than
I, there is no reason that this package could not be put in the form of legislation.
66. Dukeminier, supra note 7.
67. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 22.
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He also opposes the Act because it will permit continuation of trusts
containing perpetuities violations for up to 90 years, and perhaps
longer. This is undesirable both from a societal point of view because
it extends the period of dead hand control, and from the family's point
of view. An instrument that violates the Rule was probably drawn by
an unskilled lawyer, who probably also failed to include the powers
necessary to incorporate flexibility into a long-term trust. Validating
the contingent interests permits the defective trust to continue to the
detriment of the family, which will be caught up in the trust's strait-
jacket. He also suggests that 90-year tax saving trusts marketed by the
financial services industry will be similarly unsuited to the task.65
Professor Waggoner has completely opposing views. He predicts
that the effect of the Uniform Act will simply be to rescue beneficiaries
from the mistakes of their donors' lawyers. In his view, the Uniform
Act makes available to all the benefits that heretofore have been
reserved for those rich enough and lucky enough to find a lawyer who
could create long-term trusts without violating the Rule. The Act cre-
ates social benefits by effectuating donor intent, even if the result is to
tie up property within the outer limits of the common law Rule. In
addition, he disagrees that the American public will be attracted to use
of 90-year trusts.69
While I am inclined to agree with Professor Dukeminier's assess-
ment of the probability that instruments creating Rule violations are
also badly drafted in other respects, and with the likely attractiveness
of a 90-year tax saving trust, I am also inclined to think that there are
other solutions to those problems. Recent statutory revisions in Cali-
fornia provide courts with the ability to modify trust provisions that
become counterproductive, whether those provisions govern manage-
ment of the assets or disposition of the income and principal.70 Simi-
lar provisions could be enacted in conjunction with enactment of the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. In states which adopt
the Uniform Act without such additional statutes, judges could look
to statutes in other jurisdictions as additional bases on which they
might extend their traditional equitable powers to modify trust provi-
sions to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. If courts or legislatures
68. Dukeminier, supra note 7.
69. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 22.
70. CA. PROB. CODE § 15409 (West Supp. 1990) provides that on petition by a trustee or
beneficiary, the court may modify the administrative or dispositive provisions of the trust or
terminate the trust if, owing to circumstances not known to, or anticipated by, the settlor, the
continuation of the trust under its terms would defeat or substantially impair the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust. If necessary, the court may order the trustee to do
acts forbidden by the trust instrument.
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are willing to remedy poor drafting by providing flexibility, the egalita-
rian ideal of making the benefits of long-term trusts available beyond
the group of the super rich or sophisticated could be furthered with
the 90-year trust of the Uniform Act.
That brings us to the more difficult questions: are long-term trusts
good or harmful for society or for families? If they are good, are they
good only for a certain period of time? If there is a limit beyond which
they become undesirable, does "lives in being plus 21 years" capture
that limit? Should long term trusts be made available to everyone
whose assets will justify the expense of trust management? All of the
participants in the current Perpetuities Wars seem to accept, almost
without discussion, the ideas that dead hand control is bad and that
lives in being plus 21 years imposes a suitable limit on its reach.7 1
While I am inclined to agree, the question might be worth some
further exploration.7 2 In particular, I think a readily available 90-year
trust might have some benefits. If you believe that Americans do not
save enough, and we are therefore in the process of losing our domi-
nant position in the world's economy, you might also believe that we
should be actively looking for ways to encourage ourselves and our
fellow citizens to save. 73 Increasing the availability of IRA's is recur-
71. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 9, at 26.
72. I confess at the outset that I don't know the answers to these questions. I know little of
economics, less about the security of pension plans and social security, and not much about the
actual amount of property currently held in long-term trusts, pension plans, and IRA's. I
suspect, however, that I know about as much about most of these subjects as most of my
colleagues who worry about dead hand control and the utility of the Rule Against Perpetuities in
late twentieth century America.
73. Two Wall Street Journal articles illustrate the deluge of material in the common press
telling us that we need to save more. On the front page, writer David Wessel tells us that the
national savings rate-what is left of private savings after subtracting the deficit-is lower than
our postwar average and lower than that of Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, and Japan.
The problem is that:
When a nation saves too little, it doesn't pay the price for decades. Profligacy is fun. But
it means that the U.S. isn't investing enough to assure a better life for our children and
grandchildren. It also forces the U.S. to borrow heavily from abroad, incurring debts that
coming generations will have to pay.
Wessel, As Cold War Ends, Will Savings Rise?, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 5. On the
second page, Alan Murray tells us that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, an international economic association, in its annual review of the United States econ-
omy, called on America to reduce its budget deficit and change its tax structure to encourage
national savings. The result of our budget being too high and our saving rate too low is "a heavy
dependence on foreign capital to finance U.S. economic growth." Murray, U.S. Urged to Cut
Budget Deficit, Change Taxation, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at A-2, col. 3.
Lack of savings, of course, is not alone to blame for our decline in economic dominance. Poor
education, sloppy management habits, and an unwillingness to work hard are also frequently
mentioned as contributing causes. Nor is the problem of our economic decline the only one we
might want to address by encouraging more private savings. There are charges that pension
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rently suggested as a way to promote more savings,7 4 but 90-year
trusts could do much more.7 5 A well drafted trust can provide a stable
but flexible financial base for a family, as well as a source of forced
savings for the economy. Since the size and terms of the trusts can be
tailored to family needs, they are likely to attract more funds than
IRA's. If Americans can be encouraged to save more by readily avail-
able 90-year trusts, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
may promote sound public policy, rather than the reverse.
Those who argue that encouraging long-term trusts is bad social
policy raise a number of points. Some say that assets in trust harm the
economy rather than helping it because they must be conservatively
invested.7 6 I am not convinced. It seems to me that some portion of a
society's assets should be placed in conservative investments, and that
portion might as well include the assets held in private trusts. The
question we need to ask is whether we have too many assets restricted
to conservative investments, and if this is a problem, whether the
assets held in private trust contribute significantly to the problem.77
Personally, I doubt that they do.
plans are not adequately regulated, and have increasingly been subject to depredation. Even the
social security system may be threatened again by the off-budget financing currently used to
avoid Gramm-Rudman limits. In addition, there are the enormous sums that will be needed to
clean up the toxic wastes we have piled up over the years. There seems to be no end to the
money we will need to pay off the debts we have accumulated in the twentieth century.
74. As Wessel notes:
After months of head-scratching, a Bush task force is nearing the end of its search. To
finance its proposals, it is toying with suggesting higher taxes on alcohol and tobacco and
new taxes on polluters-all taxes that would discourage consumption, rather than saving.
But some top administration officials already are pouring cold water on that idea. So the
likely result will be another pledge to reduce the deficit, a new call for Americans to be
thrifty and a modest proposal for a new-fangled Individual Retirement Account that would
offer a tax break in the future instead of an immediate deduction.
Wessel, supra note 73.
75. IRA's are limited to small amounts of money, probably cost the government quite a bit in
foregone taxes, and impose substantial penalties if the owner of the account needs to withdraw
the money before age 591A.
76. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 17, at 779 (quoting F. LAWSON & B.
RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 185-88 (2d ed. 1982)):
Trust capital and risk capital are very different.... And since economic progress in the
modern world demands bold speculation, it is a matter of public concern to preserve a
proper balance between trust capital and risk capital .... A fortiori individuals should not
be unduly protected against themselves. They should have ample scope to take risks and, if
necessary, go bankrupt. The economic health of a nation is, according to one view,
measured by the number of its bankruptcies. Trusts exist to prevent bankruptcies. Hence
they should be curbed.
77. Since assets held in pension plans subject to ERISA are subject to the same kind of
"prudent investor" standard as assets in private trusts, they must be considered in any discussion
of the problems caused by the existence or amount of assets held in conservative investments.
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Others argue that the property of the world should be controlled by
the living rather than the dead."8 While this argument has intuitive
appeal, the premise is subject to some question. When property is held
in trust, management of the assets is not controlled by the dead, but by
a trustee who is a living person,79 within the confines of trust invest-
ment law which is controlled by legislatures and courts with living
members. Under the prudent investor standard which controls most
trust investments, permissible investments are determined entirely by
practices of living investors. Even when the donor has specified a dif-
ferent investment policy, courts can modify it if the policy produces
unacceptable levels of risk or return.80
The arguments over the costs and benefits of dead hand control are
no easier to assess in trying to determine whether long-term trusts are
good or bad for families. The primary effect of the Rule Against Per-
petuities is to limit the extent to which the dead hand can control
future ownership of property. The Rule requires that ultimate owner-
ship be knowable within 21 years after lives in being. The harm con-
trolled is that of uncertainty. Whether uncertainty is really bad for
families is another hard question to answer.
Certainty of ownership is good both for the person who ends up
owning the property and for the person who loses it, because it permits
both to plan their lives accordingly. On the other hand, certainty of
receiving gift property may reduce the incentive to productive labor
for the recipient. Certainty of loss may produce a sense of unfairness,
and demoralization or worse in the loser, which may lead to
unproductivity or even unsocial conduct. Having property tied up in a
trust providing a steady stream of economic benefits to a family may
provide a solid base from which family members can pursue produc-
tive lives without the insecurity and compromises on education and
culture that lack of money may bring. Alternatively, it may induce
them to arrogance and sloth. If more members of our society had a
secure financial base, we might have a healthier, better educated and
more creative society. We might end up, however, with a more com-
placent, boring, and less productive society. Who knows?
78. L. SIMES, supra note 27, at 56-60 says that the Rule:
strikes a fair balance between the desires of members of the present generation, and similar
desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property which they
enjoy. . . . But, . . . an even more important reason for the Rule is this. It is socially
desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living members and not by the
dead.
79. Even if the trustee is a corporation, investment decisions are made by living people.
80. Modification is usually permitted only if changes in conditions are shown, but that should
seldom provide a barrier to modification today.
352
Vol. 65:323, 1990
Perpetuities Essays
In sum, I find it very difficult to feel certain either that more dead
hand control is a bad thing or that it is a good thing. I envy those who
are confident that we will be better or worse off if we permit 90-year
trusts-I am not at all sure. Of one thing, however, I am sure: enact-
ment of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities would not be
the end of the world. Whatever problems would be created by bad
drafting of long-term trusts could be ameliorated by increasing the dis-
cretionary powers of trustees, and increasing the ability of courts and
beneficiaries to modify and terminate trusts. The law does not need to
leave beneficiaries of poorly drafted 90-year trusts tied up in
straitjackets.
APPENDIX: CLASS HANDOUT AND DIAGRAM
The Rule Against Perpetuities invalidates contingent remainders,
class gifts, and executory interests unless they must vest, if at all, not
later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the inter-
est. In analyzing future interests to determine whether they violate the
Rule, you are trying to figure out whether there is any possibility,
however remote, that the interest could vest more than 21 years after
the death of the last person who was alive at the time the future inter-
est was created. If there is, the future interest violates the Rule, and is
invalid; if there is not, the interest is valid.
There are four preliminary matters you must understand before you
begin your analysis of conveyances that create future interests.
(1) The Rule applies only to contingent remainders, vested remain-
ders subject to open, and executory interests. It does not apply to inde-
feasibly vested remainders, reversions, possibilities of reverter, or rights
of entry.
(2) Vesting means either vesting in interest or vesting in possession,
whichever occurs first. A class gift, whether a remainder or an execu-
tory interest, is vested only when the class is closed and all class mem-
bers have met all conditions precedent to taking the interest.
(3) The "date of creation of the future interest," called "the effective
date" of the instrument, is the date of the testator's death if the instru-
ment is a will. It is the date the conveyance became effective if the
instrument is an inter vivos conveyance. If anyone holds an unrestricted
power to revoke the instrument, or the future interest, it is the date the
power terminates.
(4) In figuring out whether there is any way that the interest could
possibly vest more than 21 years after the deaths of all the people who
were alive at the effective date of the instrument, you must observe the
biology of the Rule, which includes the following axioms:
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a. A person can live to any age, and can continue to live, even if
there are no other living persons in the world.
b. A person can die at any time. A corollary is that everybody
can die at any time, including everybody at the same time.
c. A person can bear or beget a child at any age, without regard
to that person's physical condition or medical realities.
d. A person can marry at any age, can divorce at any age, and
can marry another person of any age, including a person who was
not alive at the effective date (an afterborn).
To determine whether a future interest violates the Rule, follow
these steps:
STEP 1: Classify the interests created by the disposition to identify
those that are subject to the Rule. Are there any contingent remain-
ders? class gifts? executory interests?
STEP 2: Enter each interest subject to the Rule on a time-line dia-
gram. Then write in all the conditions precedent to the vesting of the
interest. Is there any possibility that an unborn person could take the
interest? If so, be sure to include birth as a condition precedent.
STEP 3: If there are any class gifts, enter each class separately, and
for each one write down the event(s) that will close the class biologi-
cally. Who has to die before you will know who all the members of
the class are? (Who are the people who can give birth to class mem-
bers or to their parents?) Then write down the events that will close
the class under the rule of convenience. When can the first class mem-
ber call for a distribution of his or her share? Can that take place
before the class will close biologically?
STEP 4: Identify the effective date of the instrument.
STEP 5: List the people that you know are alive at the effective date
under the "lives in being" heading to the left of the effective date line.
STEP 6: Take the first interest that is subject to the Rule, and figure
out a sequence of events that could take place after the effective date
that would lead to vesting of the interest. Then figure out a sequence
that would lead to failure of the interest because it becomes impossible
for the conditions precedent ever to happen. Think about how long it
will take before you would know whether the interest had vested or
failed under those sequences.
STEP 7: Enter the sequence that takes the longest time you can
think of on the time line. Draw additional time lines for other
sequences that you can think of. Enter the events of the sequences on
the time lines, using arrows to mark where each event takes place. Be
sure to mark the number of years between the effective date and the
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events in the sequence. Have you included the possibility of
afterborns?
STEP 8. Draw a vertical line immediately after the effective date to
represent a disaster that eliminates everyone in the world except the
people you listed to the left as lives in being. (Remember that this is
possible under the ground rules-you must consider everything that
could possibly happen.)
STEP 9: Identify all the people who were alive at the effective date
and according to your diagram are still alive within 21 years of the
vesting point. Try killing each of them off more than 21 years before
the vesting point. Enter the deaths of all those who can be killed more
than 21 years before vesting on your time line.
STEP 10: Look to see whether there is anyone still alive who was
alive at the effective date, or whether there is anyone who died within
21 years of the vesting point. If there is, try again to kill that person
more than 21 years before vesting. If you cannot, you can conclude
that the sequence of events you have been looking at is one which will
necessarily lead to vesting within 21 years of some life in being. The
person or group you have found is the validating life (sometimes called
the measuring life) for the sequence you have just tested. Go on to
Step 13. If you cannot find any validating life for the sequence, look
again. If you still cannot, go to Step 11.
STEP 11: If you cannot find a validating life that proves the interest
must vest within 21 years after some life in being, ask whether there is
anything that would cause the interest to fail if it had not vested by
some earlier point in time. If the interest is a class gift, look to see
whether some class member would be able to call for distribution of
her share at an earlier time. If so, that would make it impossible for
people born after that date to come into the class under the rule of
convenience, so their interests would fail. If the interest will necessar-
ily fail if it has not vested by a particular time, look to see whether this
would have to happen within 21 years after the death of some life in
being. If so, you have a validating life. If you still have no validating
life, you have either missed a validating life, or you have found an
interest that violates the Rule.
STEP 12. Think of all the other sequences of events that would lead
to vesting of the interest, or to failure of the interest because it
becomes impossible that the conditions precedent will ever occur.
Remember that anyone alive can have a child, even if the person is
aged 5 or 85. Have you included the possibility of people being born
after the effective date as parents, spouses, and takers?
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Repeat steps 7 through 10 for each sequence until you find a
sequence for which you can find no validating life, or until you are
satisfied that there is no sequence which lacks a validating life. If you
find one that lacks a validating life, you have proved that the interest
violates the Rule. If you find a validating life for every sequence, you
may conclude that the interest is valid. If you have thought of all
possible sequences of events that will lead to vesting and failure, you
are right. If you have not, you are wrong.
STEP 13: Go on to another disposition and repeat Steps 1-12.
Keep practicing until you feel comfortable with the process.
PERPETUITIES DIAGRAM
Disposition:
Interests created:
INTEREST SUBJECT TO THE
RULE #1:
Conditions Precedent:
1.
3.
Class Gifts:
Class:
Class closing:
Biological:
Rule of Convenience:
TIME LINE SEQUENCE # 1:
Lives
in
Being:
Effective Date
Validating Life Sequence # 1:
TIME LINE SEQUENCE #2:
Lives
in
Being:
Effective Date
Validating Life Sequence # 1:
INTEREST SUBJECT TO THE
RULE #2:
Conditions Precedent:
1.
2.
3.
Class Gifts:
Class:
Class closing:
Biological:
Rule of Convenience:
TIME LINE SEQUENCE #1:
Lives
in
Being:
Effective Date
Validating Life Sequence #1:
TIME LINE SEQUENCE #2:
Lives
in >
Being:
Effective Date
Validating Life Sequence #2:
